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SHOULD IRISH EYES BE SMILING? THE
HIDDEN ISSUE OF STATE ACTION IN
HURLEY v. IRISH-AMERICAN GAY, LESBIAN
AND BISEXUAL GROUP OF BOSTON
INTRODUCTION
One of the fundamental purposes of the First Amendment' is
to guarantee an effective system of free expression.2 Although
'"Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech or, of the
press ...."U.S. CONST. amend I.
2 The Framers of the Constitution implicitly recognized the vital importance of
free speech when they provided for a representative democracy, a form of govern-
ment that is rendered meaningless without open and vigorous debate about officials
and their policies. See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring) ("[The Framers] believed that freedom to think as you will and to speak
as you think are means indispensable to the discovery and spread of political truth;
that without free speech and assembly discussion would be futile ... that public dis-
cussion is a political duty; and that this should be a fundamental principle of the
American government."); Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an Abso-
lute, 1961 SuP. CT. REV. 245, 255 (stating First Amendment "protects the freedom of
those activities of thought and communication by which we 'govern'"). The freedom
to express one's views is necessary not only for the development of the political sys-
tem, but also for its preservation. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484
(1957) ("The protection given [free] speech and press was fashioned to assure unfet-
tered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes de-
sired by the people."); Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931) ("The main-
tenance of the opportunity for free political discussion to the end that government
may be responsive to the will of the people and that changes may be obtained by
lawful means, an opportunity essential to the security of the Republic, is a funda-
mental principle of our constitutional system."); Kent Greenawalt, Speech and
Crime, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 645, 672-73 (asserting freedom of expression
contributes to social stability by assuring resentment does not deny opportunity to
present grievances which may lead to radical overthrow of existing institutions); see
also Gilmore v. City of Montgomery, 417 U.S. 556, 575 (1974) (stating that freedom
of association "oils the machinery of democratic government and insures peaceful,
orderly change"); cf Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting) (suggesting "that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get
itself accepted in the competition of the market ... "). See generally Stanley Ingber,
The Marketplace of Ideas: A Legitimizing Myth, 1984 DUKE L.J. 1 (analyzing Justice
Holmes' "marketplace of ideas" theory); David M. Rabban, The Emergence of Modern
First Amendment Doctrine, 50 U. CmH. L. REV. 1205 (1983) (arguing that ultimate
goal of First Amendment was to create "marketplace of ideas").
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subject to some limitations,3 the freedom of speech may not be
inhibited on the basis of content, no matter how discriminatory
or hateful the message may be.4 The right of free speech, how-
ever, is protected only against governmental infringement be-
cause the Constitution does not guard against the actions of
purely private parties.6 The resulting public/private distinction
For example, "the government may enforce reasonable time, place, and man-
ner regulations as long as the restrictions are content-neutral, are narrowly tailored
to serve a significant government interest, and leave open ample alternative chan-
nels of communication." United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 177 (1983) (internal
quotations and citations omitted); see 4 JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16.47 (4th ed. 1991) (explaining content-neutral time, place
and manner limitations); see also Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 119-20
(1972) (finding as reasonable time and place restriction prohibition of any speech on
sidewalk surrounding school building which might disturb classes in progress); Ad-
derley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 46-48 (1966) (affirming trespass convictions of protes-
tors on jailhouse grounds, viewing jailhouse property as unreasonable place).
4 See Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972) ("[Albove all else,
the First Amendment means that government has no power to restrict expression
because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content."); Street v. New
York, 394 U.S. 576, 592 (1969) ("[Plublic expression of ideas may not be prohibited
merely because the ideas are themselves offensive to some of their hearers."); South
Boston Allied War Veterans Council v. City of Boston, 875 F. Supp. 891, 896 (D.
Mass. 1995) ("[Tlhe First Amendment protects speech without regard to the truth or
social utility of the ideas expressed."); see also LAURENCE H. TRIBE, CONSTrru-
TIONAL CHOICES 189 (1985) (speculating that "commitment to the First Amendment
requires us to guarantee a forum for Nazis and others whose thought we hate"). But
see Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 482 (1957) ("The guaranties of freedom of
expression ... gave no absolute protection for every utterance."); Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571 (1942) ("Allowing the broadest scope to the language
and purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment, it is well understood that the right of
free speech is not absolute at all times and under all circumstances.").
' The language of the First Amendment explicitly limits its application to fed-
eral infringement. "Congress shall make no law ... ." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
(emphasis added). The Supreme Court, in Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 665
(1925), held that the First Amendment's rights and liberties are protected from in-
fringement by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Near v.
Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 723-24 (1931) (extending Gitlow principle to freedom of
press claim); see also Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 513 (1976) (asserting free
speech only guarantees against abridgment by federal or state government). Moreo-
ver, the abridgment of free speech does not have to be intentional to violate the
First Amendment. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 461 (1958) (recognizing
"abridgment of [First Amendment] rights, even though unintended, may inevitably
follow from varied forms of governmental action").
6 See, e.g., Public Utils. Conm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 461 (1952) (explaining
that First Amendment "concededly appl[ies] to and restrict[s] only the Federal gov-
ernment and not private persons."). The state action doctrine similarly limits the
protection afforded by the Fourteenth Amendment. Corrigan v. Buckley, 271 U.S.
323, 330 (1926) ("It is state action of a particular character that is prohibited. Indi-
vidual invasion of individual rights is not the subject matter of the [Fourteenth]
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is especially troublesome in the context of civic parades whose
organizers seek to exclude groups proselytizing messages or be-
liefs contrary to those of the organizers.7 Recently, in Hurley v.
Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston,8 the
United States Supreme Court held that requiring the organizers
of the Boston St. Patrick's Day Parade to include a group impart-
ing a message that the organizers did not wish to convey violated
Amendment.") (citations omitted); Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313, 318 (1879) ("The
provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment ... all have reference to state action ex-
clusively, and not to any action of private individuals.").
The underlying dilemma presented by this conflict is that both parties possess
valid First Amendment claims. The organizers wish to conduct a parade, which has
been recognized as a constitutionally protected form of expression. See Ancient Or-
der of Hibernians v. Dinldns, 814 F. Supp. 358, 366 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) ("[A] parade or-
ganized by a private sponsor is the quintessential exercise of the First Amendment
right of freedom of expression.") (citation omitted); see also Shuttlesworth v.
Birmington, 394 U.S. 147, 152 (1969); Catholic War Veterans v. New York, 576 F.
Supp. 71, 75 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); Long Beach Lesbian & Gay Pride, Inc. v. Long Beach,
14 Cal. App. 4th 312, 324 (1993). A parade, however, does not constitute "pure
speech." See Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 555 (1965). The Cox court noted:
We emphatically reject the notion ... that the First and Fourteenth
Amendments afford the same kind of freedom to those who would commu-
nicate ideas by conduct such as patrolling, marching, and picketing on
streets and highways, as these amendments afford to those who communi-
cate ideas by pure speech.
Id.; see also Sixteenth of September Planning Comm. v. Denver, 474 F. Supp. 1333,
1338 (D. Colo. 1979) (noting that parades and marches are not shielded from regu-
lation to same extent as pure speech). The government may impose content-neutral
time, place, and manner restrictions which are "narrowly tailored to serve a signifi-
cant governmental interest and leave[] open adequate alternative channels for
speech." Invisible Empire of the Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. Town of Thurmont,
700 F. Supp. 281, 285 (D. Md. 1988).
Similarly, the groups seeking inclusion have a First Amendment right to assert
their viewpoint. The constitutional infringement presented by these groups, how-
ever, "is more subtle than that found in other First Amendment cases dealing with
the use of streets and other public property by a single group." North Shore Right to
Life Comm. v Manhassett Am. Legion Post No. 304, 452 F. Supp. 834, 838 (S.D.N.Y.
1978). This is due to the fact that organizers are preventing groups from marching
in the organizer's parade, not preventing groups from marching in their own private
parades. See id. Allowing parade organizers to exclude groups, the government may
be abridging the constitutional rights of would be participants. See Mari J. Matsuda,
Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story, 87 MICH. L. REV.
2320, 2374-80 (1989) (asserting constitutional protection of racist speech is form of
state action promoting racism). If, however, the State attempts to force inclusion of
the dissident group, it is compelling the organizers to propound a message with
which they disagree. See, e.g., Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 475
U.S. 1, 15 (1986) (holding that Commission's order impermissibly required appellant
to associate with speech that appellant may disagree).
8 115 S. Ct. 2338 (1995).
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the First Amendment.9
In 1992, the Irish-American Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual
Group of Boston ("GLIB") ° submitted an application to partici-
pate in Boston's 1992 St. Patrick's Day-Evacuation Day Parade
("Parade")." The South Boston Allied War Veterans Council
("Council"), the Parade organizer, denied GLIB permission to
march, citing safety concerns and insufficient information about
the group. 2 GLIB ultimately marched in the 1992 Parade pur-
suant to a state court order. 3
GLIB applied to participate in 1993, but the Council again
denied the application, asserting that the "decision to exclude
groups with sexual themes merely formalized that the Parade
expresses traditional religious and family values."" GLIB
brought suit in Suffolk Superior Court against Parade Adjutant
John J. "Wacko" Hurley, the Council, and the City of Boston, al-
leging violations both of the state and federal constitutions and
of Massachusetts' public accommodations law. 5 The trial court
9 Id. at 2340-41.
'0 GLIB was formed for the express purpose of marching in the 1992 Parade in
order to "express pride in their Irish heritage as openly gay, lesbian and bisexual
individuals, to demonstrate that there are such men and women among those so de-
scended, and to express their solidarity with [the Irish Lesbians and Gays] who
sought to march in New York's St. Patrick's Day Parade." Id. at 2341 (citation omit-
ted).
11 Id.
2Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston v. City of Boston,
636 N.E.2d 1293, 1295 (1994), rev'd sub nom. Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian
& Bisexual Group of Boston, 115 S. Ct. 2338 (1995).
13 1d.
14 Id.
'5 Hurley, 115 S. Ct. at 2341. The public accommodations law prohibits "any
distinction, discrimination or restriction on account of ... sexual orientation ... rela-
tive to the admission of any person to, or his treatment in any places of public ac-
commodation, resort or amusement." MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 98 (West
1995). "Places of public accommodation, resort or amusement" are defined as "any
place, whether licensed or unlicensed, which is open to and accepts or solicits the
patronage of the general public." MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 92A (West 1995).
The statute provides a non-inclusive list which includes inns, taverns, hotels, retail
establishments, recreational facilities and theaters. Id.; see also Local Fin. Co. v.
Massachusetts Comm'n against Discrimination, 242 N.E.2d 536, 538-39 (Mass.
1968) (recognizing that specific examples of public accommodations enumerated in
statute neither restrict statute's general language or provide basis for asserting
ejusdem generis).
Whether an establishment or activity constitutes a public accommodation ap-
pears to turn on the selectivity of the admittance process. See Concord Rod & Gun
Club, Inc. v. Massachusetts Comm'n against Discrimination, 524 N.E.2d 1364, 1366-
67 (Mass. 1988). In Concord Rod & Gun Club, the Supreme Judicial Court of Mas-
[Vol. 70:313316
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granted an order mandating GLIB's inclusion in the Parade.16
The court determined that the Parade was not an expressive ac-
tivity,17 but rather qualified as a "public accommodation" under
Massachusetts' law. 8 The exclusion of GLIB on the grounds of
its members sexual orientation, therefore, violated the public ac-
commodation law's anti-discrimination provisions. 9
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts affirmed the
decision."0 Specifically, the high court held that the 1993 Parade
lacked an expressive purpose, and further, constituted a public
accommodation." As such, the Parade was subject to Massachu-
setts' prohibition against sexual-orientation discrimination.22
The United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that the
state-mandated inclusion of GLIB into the Parade altered the
expressive content of the Parade and violated the Council's First
Amendment rights.' Justice Souter, writing for a unanimous
Court, found that the South Boston celebration fell within the
realm of constitutionally protected expressive activity. Al-
though the Council was lenient in admitting participants, the
sachusetts held that a fishing and hunting club was a public accommodation. Id. Al-
though the Club had limited membership and a non-profit purpose, the court found
that it was a public accommodation because obtaining sponsorship, which was tan-
tamount to acceptance as a member, indicated a total absence of genuine selectivity
in membership. Id.
'6 Hurley, 115 S. Ct. at 2341.
'7 Id. at 2341-42.
'a Id.
'9 Id.; see supra note 15 (quoting language of statute). The trial court reasoned
that the Council's lack of selectivity in admitting sponsors and participants ren-
dered the Parade a public accommodation. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian, & Bisexual
Group of Boston v. City of Boston, 636 N.E.2d 1293, 1296 (Mass. 1994), rev'd sub
nom. Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian, & Bisexual Group of Boston, 115 S. Ct.
2338 (1995). The range of interests and viewpoints represented by the participants
and sponsors, the lack of written procedures, criteria, and standards for selecting
participants, and the participation of groups who were not required to submit an
application compelled the trial court to find that the Parade was an open recrea-
tional event which lacked an expressive purpose. Id. at 1296-98. See generally supra
note 15 (discussing general applicability of Massachusetts public accommodations
law); Marjorie Heins, Massachusetts Civil Rights Law, 76 MASs. L. REV. 77, 77-79
(1993) (analyzing Commonwealth's prohibition against discrimination in public ac-
commodations and evaluating potential for success under "freedom of association"
defense).
21 Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston, 636 N.E.2d at 1300.
21 Id.
'Id. at 1297-1300.
2Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston, 115 S.
Ct. 2338, 2340-41 (1995).
24 Id. at 2345.
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Court reasoned that an organizer does not forfeit its autonomy to
choose its own message simply by "combining multifarious
voices, or by failing to edit their themes [in order] to isolate an
exact message as the exclusive subject matter of the speech.""
Justice Souter concluded that the state court's application of
Massachusetts' public accommodations law violated the Council's
autonomy, since it compelled the Council to propound a message
with which it did not agree." The Court rejected GLIB's asser-
tion that its inclusion would not compromise the Council's mes-
sage, reasoning that each individual unit participating in the pa-
rade contributed to the message and common theme of the
parade.27 The Court further reasoned that the State did not pos-
sess a sufficiently compelling interest to support a restriction
upon the Council's First Amendment rights because the St. Pat-
rick's Day Parade was not the only conduit for the members of
' Id. at 2345-47.
26 Id. at 2347. The Court has recognized an individual's First Amendment right
to refrain from speaking when the government seeks to advance its own message
through compelled speech. See, e.g., Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 717 (1977)
(holding that New Hampshire could not require its citizens to carry objectionable
message, "Live Free or Die", on their vehicle license plates); Elrod v. Burns, 427
U.S. 347, 356 (1976) (holding that public employer could not compel its employees to
support specific political party as condition of employment); West Virginia State Bd.
of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (holding that State could not require
students to participate in teacher-led pledge of allegiance to United States flag); see
also Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 593-94 (1992) (holding that government-
sponsored prayer at public secondary school graduation ceremony violated Estab-
lishment Clause due to psychological pressure to participate); Torcaso v. Watkins,
367 U.S. 488, 496 (1961) (striking down Maryland requirement that civil servants
utter oath affirming belief in God). The Court has extended this protection to en-
compass state action compelling a party to carry or foster the speech of another pri-
vate party. See, e.g., Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1, 5-7
(1986) (striking down state utility commissioner's rule requiring privately owned
utility to include in its billing envelopes third party communication that utility disa-
greed); Miami Herald Pub. Co. v. Turnillo, 418 U.S. 241, 255-56 (1974) (declaring
unconstitutional Florida statute requiring newspaper to publish political candidate's
reply to critical editorials published in newspaper). But see PruneYard Shopping
Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 87-88 (1980). In PruneYard, the California Supreme
Court interpreted the state constitution as entitling its citizens to "exercise free ex-
pression and petition rights on shopping center property." Id. at 87. The United
States Supreme Court affirmed, holding that this reading did not violate shopping
center owners' First Amendment rights since owners were not being "compelled to
affirm their belief in any governmentally prescribed position or view" and were able
to expressly disavow any connection with speaker's message by posting signs. Id. at
88. 27 Hurley, 115 5. Ct. at 2349.
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GLIB to express their ideas.' In the absence of such a compel-
ling interest, the Court declined to apply the public accommoda-
tions statute, and upheld the Council's constitutionally protected
right to choose its own message.29
It is submitted that the Supreme Court erred by not first in-
quiring whether the Council was a private or state actor prior to
holding that the state-mandated inclusion of GLIB violated the
Council's First Amendment rights. Had the Council been found
to be a public actor, its exclusion of GLIB would have been dis-
criminatory and violative of the United States Constitution.
Given the Council's apparent close links to the city of Boston, an
examination of its status was necessary. Instead, the trial
court's erroneous determination that the Council's First
Amendment rights were not implicated" precluded appellate re-
view and a determination of the organizer's precise nature.31 As
a result, the Supreme Court had no occasion to determine
whether the Council was in fact a private organizer or a state ac-
tor.32 Although neither party subsequently raised the issue in its
briefs,33 the Supreme Court, in order to properly adjudicate the
matter, should have exercised its discretionary power and de-
termined whether the Council was a state actor before deciding
whether the Council's free speech rights had been infringed.
34
2 Id.; cf. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 114 S. Ct. 2445, 2456-57 (1994). In
Turner the Court noted that the "cable system functions ... as a conduit for the
speech of others ... ." Id. Unlike a parade, a cable system is "a franchised channel
giving monopolistic opportunity to shut out some speakers." Hurley, 115 S. Ct. at
2349. This power gives rise to a compelling governmental interest that is distin-
guishable from the interest in permitting GLIB to march in the Parade. Id.
29 Hurley, 115 S. Ct. at 2349-51 (suggesting denial of access to public accommo-
dations is not same as preserving expressive activities).
:3 Id. at 2344-46 (providing Supreme Court's independent examination of rec-
ord).
31 See id. at 2343.
32 See id. at 2342-43 (stating that Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
found trial judge's determination of no state action to be "clearly erroneous").
3 The state action issue was initially raised in an amicus brief filed by the
ACLU. Mot. for Leave to File and Br. Amicus Curiae of the ACLU in Support of Nei-
ther Party at 10, Hurley (No. 94-749), available in LEXIS, Genfed Library, Usbriefs
File (Feb. 21, 1995) [hereinafter ACLU Brief]. The only acknowledgment of the issue
by either party was a footnote in the respondent's brief. Br. for Resp't at 14 n.17,
Hurley (No. 94-749), available in LEXIS, Genfed Library, Usbriefs File (Mar. 31,
1995). The Court, however, raised the issue sua sponte during oral arguments. Tr. of
Oral Argument at 8-9, Hurley (No. 94-749), available in 1995 WL 301703.
' The Court normally refuses to consider issues which are not raised by the
parties in the petition for certiorari. See Sup. Ct. R. 14.1(a) ("Only the questions set
forth in the petition, or fairly included therein, will be considered by the Court.");
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Such a determination would have provided a definitive state-
ment by the Court regarding the proper application of the state
action doctrine to organizers of expressive parades and quelled
the unending litigation surrounding this fact intensive issue.
Part One of this Comment analyzes the historical foundation
of the St. Patrick's-Evacuation Day Parade. Part Two provides
an overview of the state action doctrine, focusing on its applica-
tion to the unique factual situations presented by expressive pa-
rades. Part Three analyzes the 1993 Parade under the tradi-
tional lines of state action doctrine. This Comment concludes
that the Council should not be classified as a state actor; there-
fore, parade organizers similarly situated to the Council should
not be prevented from excluding a group which advocates posi-
tions inconsistent with the parade's overall message.
I. ST. PATRICK'S DAY IN BOSTON
The first St. Patrick's Day Parade in Boston occurred in
1841 when 2000 boisterous Irishmen took to the streets in order
to proclaim their pride in their religion and heritage.35 These in-
accord Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 129 (1954) (plurality). The fact that the
issue was raised before the Court during oral arguments, Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S.
201, 206 n.5 (1954), or in an amicus brief, United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 746
(1976), does not affect the general rule. The Court, however, has broad discretionary
power to consider issues not raised in the petition for certiorari. See United States
v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 905 (1984) (stating Court had "power" to base its decision on
either question presented in petition for certiorari or on different theory not briefed
or argued but refused to exercise power). See generally CHARLES A. WRIGHT, THE
LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 800-01 (5th ed. 1984) (restating general rule and recogniz-
ing Court's ability to depart from it). This discretionary power arises from the in-
herent power granted the Court to take whatever action it deems just and necessary
as to matters within its jurisdiction to decide. See 28 U.S.C. § 2106 (1994)
(authorizing Court to "affirm, modify, vacate, set aside, or reverse ... or require such
further proceedings to be had as may be just under the circumstances" with respect
to any court's judgment "lawfully brought before it for review"); Wood v. Georgia,
450 U.S. 261, 265 n.5 (1981) (considering conflict of interest question not technically
raised but required in interest of justice).
"The celebration of St. Patrick's Day in Boston traces its roots to the tradi-
tional dinners hosted by the Charitable Irish and Shamrock Societies in the early
1800's. See OscAR HANDLIN, BOSTON'S IMMIGRANTS 155, 157-58 (1959). The sponta-
neous parade in 1841 arose largely because the formal celebrations sponsored by
these societies could no longer accommodate the growing tide of Irish immigrants
fleeing the potato crop failures of the 1830's and the majority of Irish immigrants
could not afford the cost of the dinners. See id. at 157-58. See generally KENNETH H.
CONNELL, THE POPULATION OF IRELAND 1750-1845 (1950) (analyzing population
fluctuations in Ireland due to emigration from early potato crop failures and tithing
by Church of England); Hugh A. Mulligan, "Parade" of the Irish Began as Flight
from Famine, Oppression, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 16, 1986, at 2 (discussing obstacles
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formal parades through the streets of South Boston continued
until 1901, when the City of Boston officially sanctioned a cele-
bration of both the feast day of St. Patrick6 and Evacuation
Day." The city sponsorship of the annual festivities continued
faced by 4.2 million Irish immigrants who fled to America). Mr. Mulligan summa-
rized the three disappointments faced by an Irish immigrant landing in America:
"First, he found the streets weren't paved with gold. Next, that they weren't paved
at all. And thirdly, he would be expected to pave them." Id. at 3.
The early parades enabled the Irish immigrants to proudly proclaim their heri-
tage at a time when the Irish were confronted with both religious and ethnic perse-
cution. See THOMAS H. O'CONNOR, SOUTH BOSTON: MY HOME TowN 33-56 (Quinlan
Press 1988) (describing flow of immigration and problems Irish faced); see also
HANDLIN, supra, at 205 (discussing revival in Irish nationalism in South Boston due
to attacks by "Know-Nothings" in 1850's); Larry W. Yackle, Parading Ourselves:
Freedom of Speech at the Feast of St. Patrick, 73 B.U. L. REV. 791, 814 (1993)
(discussing development of New York City's Parade in late nineteenth century as
response to exclusion of Irish from July 4th parade by anti-Irish and anti-Catholic
forces).
36 The feast of St. Patrick commemorates the accomplishments of the cleric who
introduced Christianity to Ireland. See John T. Ridge, The History of the St. Pat-
rick's Day Parade in New York, IRISH AM. MAG., MarJApr. 1993, at 68. The religious
nature of the Parade highlights the moral issue at the heart of the controversy and
focuses a harsh and unwelcome spotlight on Irish-American attitudes, revealing
strong elements of gay-bashing and Church-bashing. The Council and the residents
of South Boston believe that the members of GLIB wish to use the Parade in order
to convey their animosity toward the Roman Catholic Church. See Dan McCole, As
You Were Saying Southies Sickened by Others Trying to Parade Ideas There,
BOSTON HERALD, Apr. 24, 1994, at 36. McCole asserts that the predominantly
Catholic community of South Boston is deeply disturbed by gay and lesbian com-
munities' aggressive agenda of animosity toward the Catholic Church and do not
wish to have homosexual activists utilize the Parade as a sounding board for their
agenda. Id.; see Don Aucoin, Gays May Sue Organizers Over St. Patrick's Parade
Ban, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 5, 1992, at 1 (quoting Council member James Kelly as
stating that GLIB's purpose was "to create a problem" and "create media atten-
tion"); see also Yackle, supra note 35, at 838 (proposing catalyst for Parade contro-
versy may have been disruption of ordination ceremony at South Boston's Holy
Cross Cathedral by militant gay rights activists); Ernest Van Den Haag, Sodom and
Begorrah: The St. Patrick's Day Flap in New York was a Clash Between 'Gay Rights'
and Catholic Values; 'Hate the Sin But Love the Sinner' is Now Deemed Insensitive;
But What Rights Should Homosexuals Have?, NAT'L REV., Apr. 29, 1991, at 35
(asserting resistance to inclusion of lesbian and gay marchers in New York parade is
"better understood as instinctive resentment at being asked to bestow moral ap-
proval on the practice of homosexuality" rather than bigotry). For a general discus-
sion about the interrelation between Catholic Church, homosexuality, and the New
York and Boston parade controversies see Yackle, supra note 35, at 852-62
(suggesting that exclusion of gays was not sincerely based on Catholicism's rejection
of homosexuality).
37 Evacuation Day commemorates the first American victory in the Revolution-
ary War, when George Washington forced the British to evacuate the city of Boston.
See ROBERT SHACKLETON, THE BOOK OF BOSTON 219-20 (1917) (discussing history of
Evacuation of Boston). South Boston folklore maintains that Brigadier John Sulli-
van, son of an Irish immigrant, had been designated by General Washington as offi-
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until 1947, when Mayor James M. Curley granted the Council
the authority to organize and conduct the Parade.38 The Council
has been the sole organizer of the Parade since that time." The
Parade, at the height of its popularity, included twenty thousand
marchers and one million spectators.40
II. STATE ACTION DocTRINE
A. Traditional State Action Analysis
Discrimination by an individual or group violates the Equal
Protection Clause41 only when it is attributable to state action.42
cer of the day and the day's password, "St. Patrick," had been chosen as a tribute to
the Irish residents of Boston. See O'CoNNoR, supra note 34, at 56. But see Yackle,
supra note 35, at 834-35 (asserting that "only connection between the British
'evacuation' and the patron saint of Ireland was Washington's use of 'St. Patrick' as
the password ... ."). Evacuation Day was officially designated as a civic holiday in
1938. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 6, § 12(k) (West 1986). The purpose of
Evacuation Day is to assure that the "first major victory in the war of American in-
dependence, namely, the evacuation of Boston by the British, may be perpetuated."
Id.
38 Hurley, 115 S. Ct. at 2341.
39 Id.
4o Id.; Morning Edition: Supreme Court Rules on Gays in Parade (National Pub-
lic Radio broadcast, June 20, 1995, transcript No. 1632-1); see Yackle, supra note 35,
at 837 (describing magnitude of Boston Parade).
41 "No State shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protec-
tion of the law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
42 E.g., Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 50 (1992) (stating racial discrimina-
tion "violates the Constitution only when it is attributable to state action"); Tulsa
Prof'l Collection Serv., Inc. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478, 485 (1988) (stating Fourteenth
Amendment protects property interest from deprivation by state action only).
The state action doctrine's sharp dichotomy between governmental and private
action has been an extremely controversial subject. See Kevin Cole, Federal and
State "State Action": The Undercritical Embrace of a Hypercriticized Doctrine, 24
GA. L. REV. 327, 348-56 (1990) (analyzing general criticisms of state action doc-
trine); Barbara R. Snyder, Private Motivation, State Action and the Allocation of Re-
sponsibility for Fourteenth Amendment Violations, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 1053, 1053
n.1 (1990) (providing long but inexhaustive list of sources regarding state action).
Although the doctrine has been greatly criticized, commentators have almost uni-
versally recognized the important values the doctrine seeks to protect. See, e.g.,
Cole, supra, at 345-89 (recognizing converging policies of federalism, individual
autonomy, and separation of powers); Alan R. Madry, Private Accountability and the
Fourteenth Amendment; State Action, Federalism, and Congress, 59 MO. L. REV.
499, 501 (1994) (identifying questions of state responsibility for private conduct and
private accountability implicit in state action doctrine); Nate Stern, State Action,
Establishment Clause, and Defamation: Blueprints for Civil Liberties in the
Rehnquist Court, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 1177-78 (1989) (arguing doctrine is essential to
"promoting private decision making largely free of the restraints necessary to con-
trol a potentially oppressive government").
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The Supreme Court has stated that "formulating an infallible
test" to determine state action is impossible.43 Instead, a finding
of "state action" can be achieved "[o]nly by sifting facts and
weighing circumstances."" Although this fact-sensitive determi-
nation resists categorization, the Court has developed three
theories by which a private party can be sufficiently tied to the
activities of a state government so that its action might violate
constitutional provisions:45 (1) the public function theory;46 (2) the
state commandment or encouragement of private activities the-
ory;" and (3) the mutual contacts theory.48 Additionally, despite
4 Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 378 (1967); see, e.g., Burton v. Wilmington
Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961) (stating "a precise formula is an impossible
task"); Kotch v. Board of River Pilots Comm'rs, 330 U.S. 552, 556 (1947) (asserting
that determining state action is "goal not attainable by the invention and applica-
tion of a precise formula"); see also Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 349-
50 (1974) (recognizing that "whether particular conduct is 'private,' on the one hand,
or 'state action' on the other, frequently admits of no easy answer"). The Court has
never attempted to articulate a precise test because the right to equal protection
was reserved in imprecise terms to allow for greater latitude in application. See
Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 939 (1982) (recognizing number of differ-
ent factors or tests to determine state action); Burton, 365 U.S. at 722 (recognizing
that "imprecise was necessary" in order for right to be enjoyed properly).
'Burton, 365 U.S. at 722; cf David S. Elkind, Note, State Action: Theories for
Applying Constitutional Restrictions to Private Activity, 74 COLUM. L. REv. 656, 704
(1974) (advocating balancing of underlying policies rather than fact sensitive analy-
sis on grounds that it would remedy problems with state action doctrine).
The Court weighs the facts objectively and analyzes the totality of the State's
involvement. Burton, 365 U.S. at 722-26; Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S.
163, 172 (1972); see also Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1013 (1982) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) ("[What is required is a realistic and delicate appraisal of the State's
involvement in the total context of the action taken."); Jackson, 419 U.S. at 360
(Douglas, J., dissenting) (asserting dispositive question is "whether the aggregate of
all relevant factors compels a finding of state responsibility."); Griffin v. State Bd. of
Educ., 296 F. Supp. 1178, 1181 (E.D. Va. 1969) ("The effect of the State's contribu-
tion is a sufficient determinant, with effect ascertained entirely objectively.").
See 2 ROTUNDA & NOwAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE
AND PROCEDURE §§ 16.2-16.4 (West 1992). The actions of a private party constitute
state action only when: (1) the private party is a regulated entity and a sufficiently
close nexus exists between the State and the specific conduct of the private party
which is the basis of the claim; (2) the State exercised coercive power over or pro-
vided significant encouragement to the private party; or (3) the private party exer-
cised powers that are traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the State. Blum, 457
U.S. at 1004-05 (citations omitted). But see Stern, supra note 42, at 1178-79
(asserting public function and "significant state involvement" theories as principal
theories for evaluating whether private conduct is tantamount to state action).
4For a discussion of the public function theory, see infra notes 65-79 and ac-
companying text.
, This Comment does not analyze the Parade under the government encour-
agement theory. In principle, however, the theory is governed by a two-step frame-
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explicit rejection by the Court, commentators contend that courts
should use a balancing analysis to handle this issue.49 It is
submitted that the government encouragement theory is inappli-
cable to expressive parades. Accordingly, the application of this
principle to the circumstances surrounding the organization of
the 1993 Parade shall not be a focus of this Comment. 50
B. State Action and Civic Parades
The state action doctrine derived from the litigation sur-
rounding the Civil War amendments"1 and has been applied to
work, established by the Court, to determine whether the State's commandment or
encouragement of a private activity constitutes state action. See Georgia v. McCol-
lum, 505 U.S. 42, 51 (1992); Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 939 (1982).
The Court first determines "whether the claimed [constitutional] deprivation has
resulted from the exercise of a right or privilege having its source in state author-
ity." Id. If the first requirement is satisfied, the Court then determines whether the
private party "may be appropriately characterized as [a] state actor." Id. The Court
considers three principles in evaluating this second step: (1) "the extent to which the
actor relies on governmental assistance and benefits"; (2) "whether the actor is per-
forming a traditional governmental function"; and (3) "whether the injury caused is
aggravated in a unique way by the incidents of governmental authority." Edmonson,
500 U.S. at 621-22 (citations omitted); see also McCollum, 505 U.S. at 51 (phrasing
factors in slightly different manner). Requiring a sufficiently close nexus between
the state action and the deprivation ensures that constitutional standards are im-
plicated only when the State bears responsibility for the specific conduct of which
the plaintiff complains. See Blum, 457 U.S. at 1004; see also Jackson, 419 U.S. at
358 (citing private company's ultimate responsibility as factor in determining
whether state action is found). But see Elkind, supra note 44, at 677 (asserting that
governmental funding of private party engaged in discriminatory conduct consti-
tutes state action not because government is "responsible" but because "government
funds should not be put to unconstitutional uses").
Any argument that the Boston parade organizers are state actors under this
rubric is without merit. Since the City of Boston does not participate in the selection
of the Parade participants, the causation requirement between the state's action
and the injury suffered by GLIB can not be established under the first level of in-
quiry and the test fails. See San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States
Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 547 (1987) (holding U.S.O.C. was not state actor, de-
spite receiving direct and indirect governmental subsidies, because there was no
governmental involvement in decision making regarding use of Olympic symbols).
48 For a discussion of the mutual contacts theory, see infra notes 80-93 and ac-
companying text.
49 See infra notes 94-100 and accompanying text (discussing balancing analysis
theory).
50 See supra note 47 (discussing inablicability of government encouragement
theory to Parade); see also Stern, supra note 42, at 1178-79 (contending government
encouragement theory has less importance than either public function or
"significant state involvement" theories).
"' The Supreme Court enunciated the state action doctrine in The Civil Rights
Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883). The Court held that there was no violation of equal pro-
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parades on the basis of their unique context and the resulting
exclusion of some members of the community.52 Subsequent
cases used the Fourteenth Amendment to attack governmental
restrictions on both protest marches53 and acts of civil disobedi-
ence.' Most recently, dissident groups attempting to force in-
clusion in parades conducted in the public forum have relied on
the state action doctrine. 55
Although the necessary inquiry remains fact specific, these
various challenges seem to present several guidelines. First, the
sponsor of a parade does not become a state actor merely because
it is issued a parade permit by the government.5 Additionally,
the provision of governmental services in conjunction with the
parade does not alone constitute state action.57  In contrast,
tection so long as neither the state government nor its agencies caused the depriva-
tion of rights guaranteed under the Fourteenth Amendment, or authorized others to
impair such rights. Id. at 17. The mere fact that private individuals had discrimina-
torily excluded black people from railroads, hotels, and theaters because of their
race did not constitute a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment because the State
had not withdrawn the rights of black people to enjoy such accommodations. Id. at
23-24.
52 See supra note 7 (discussing competing free speech issues involved in pa-
rades).
63See, e.g., Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 237-38 (1963) (applying
Fourteenth Amendment to reverse conviction for breach of peace during protest
march); cf United States v. Crowthers, 456 F.2d 1074, 1079 (4th Cir. 1972) (holding
application of disorderly conduct regulations to stop "Mass for peace" on Pentagon's
concourse violated organizer's rights); Houston Peace Coalition v. Houston City
Council, 310 F. Supp. 457, 462 (S.D. Tex. 1970) (using incorporation of First
Amendment in Fourteenth Amendment to hold that ordinance could not prevent
anti-war group from marching solely due to controversial nature of their message).
See, e.g., Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 227-28 (1964) (challenging trespass
conviction under Fourteenth Amendment when business owner refused to serve mi-
norities and minority patrons refused to leave); Lombard v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 267,
274 (1963) (employing Fourteenth Amendment to reverse trespass conviction for sit-
in demonstration).
6 See, e.g., Invisible Empire of the Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. Mayor of
Thurmont, 700 F. Supp. 281, 286-287 (D. Md. 1988); Gay Veterans Ass'n, Inc. v.
American Legion-New York County Org., 621 F. Supp. 1510, 1516 (S.D.N.Y. 1985);
North Shore Right to Life Comm. v. Manhassett Am. Legion Post No. 304, 452 F.
Supp. 834, 840 (E.D.N.Y. 1978).
See, e.g., National Socialist White People's Party v. Ringers, 473 F.2d 1010,
1016-17 (4th Cir. 1973) (asserting principle that by maintaining streets, state does
not "[espouse] the views which may be there expressed"); Invisible Empire, 700 F.
Supp. at 287 (finding that grant of parade permit does not amount to state approval
of discriminatory practices); Gay Veterans, 621 F. Supp. at 1517 (stating that "mere
issuance of a permit does not constitute state action"); cf Moose Lodge No. 107 v.
Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 177 (1972) (holding that discriminatory practices of private club
are not subject to constitutional restraints because city issued liquor license).
' See, e.g., San Francisco Arts & Athletes v. United States Olympic Comm., 483
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courts have found parade sponsors to be state actors if acting in
a fiduciary capacity for the local government,"8 or if they received
direct funding for the parade.59 This latter finding is apparently
true even if the funding had been discontinued at the time of the
action.6" It is evident that a determination of whether a parade
sponsor is a state actor is dependent upon a close examination of
its specific relationship with the governmental entity granting
the permit to march.
III. ANALYSIS OF THE 1993 PARADE
The South Boston Parade resists easy characterization as ei-
ther a public or private celebration due to the unique incidents of
government involvement in organizing and financing it.6 The
Suffolk Superior Court characterized the City of Boston's in-
volvement as follows:
Up through the 1992 Parade, the City provided the use of its of-
ficial seal, printing services, and direct funding to participants
and sponsors. Until 1993, the City provided approximately
U.S. 522, 544 (1987) ("The fact '[t]hat a private entity performs a function which
serves the public does not make its acts [state] action'") (citations omitted); Invisible
Empire, 700 F. Supp. at 287 (stating that presence of police does not "amount to
state espousal of discriminatory practices"); see also Peter M. Shane, The Rust That
Corrodes: State Action, Free Speech, and Responsibility, 52 LA. L. REV. 1585, 1595
(1992) (postulating that expressive parade "licensed, policed, and otherwise facili-
tated by government decision makers" might be construed as private action where
State does not appear to endorse organizer's message). Compare O'Hair v. Andrus,
613 F.2d 931, 936-37 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (holding that government services provided for
Mass did not endorse Pope's religious message in violation of Establishment
Clause), with Gilfillan v. City of Philadelphia, 637 F.2d 924, 934 (3d Cir. 1980)
(holding that spending city's money for special platform and other extraordinary ex-
penditures for Pope's Mass violated Establishment Clause).
" See, e.g., North Shore Right to Life, 452 F. Supp. at 837 (finding that conduct-
ing Memorial Day Parade is both fiduciary in nature and essentially public func-
tion).
'9 See Powe v. Miles, 407 F.2d 73, 81 (2d Cir. 1968) (mandating that financial
involvement be "so dominant as to afford basis for a contention that the state is
merely utilizing private trustees to administer a state activity"); see also Kerr v.
Enoch Pratt Free Library of Baltimore, 149 F.2d 212, 215 (4th Cir. 1945) (requiring
substantial finding for private group to be regarded as state actor) (emphasis
added); Grossner v. Trustees of Columbia Univ., 287 F. Supp. 535, 547-48 (S.D.N.Y.
1968) ("[Rleceipt of money from the State is not, without a good deal more, enough
to make the recipient an agency or instrumentality of the Government.").
60 See Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 302 (1966) (holding that park which was
formerly operated by city trustee could not continue to be operated by private trus-
tee with racial restrictions as required by testamentary trust).
6' See Yackle, supra note 35, at 867 (noting that parades resist definitions and
categories of conventional state action doctrine).
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twenty-five percent of the Parade's total costs through the Office
of Business and Cultural Development. The City also identified
and contacted potential participants and disseminated informa-
tion regarding the Parade.'
Additionally, the Parade celebrates both the feast day of St.
Patrick's and Evacuation Day, a Massachusetts civic holiday.63
Although the trial court's findings indicate that the administra-
tion of the Parade has been separated from the Boston govern-
ment since 1992, the City and the Council remain closely inter-
twined." Given the apparent close connections between the
Parade and the City of Boston, the possibility of state action
warrants a closer inquiry. Specifically because parade organiz-
ers resist easy categorization and because the Supreme Court
has not applied the state action doctrine to the unique factual
context presented by expressive parades, it is urged that the
Court should have conducted an inquiry. It is submitted, how-
ever, that the Council for the Boston Parade is not sufficiently
imbued with governmental authority to be considered a state ac-
tor under any of the state action theories.
A. Public Function Theory
The public function theory is perhaps the most prevalent
analytical framework employed by courts evaluating whether the
organizer of an expressive parade is a state actor. Under the
public function theory, nominally private parties are considered
state actors when they are engaged in activities which are tradi-
tionally associated with, and operated exclusively by, sovereign
government entities." The constraints placed upon state actors
6- ACLU Brief, supra note 33, at 6.
See Yackle, supra note 35, at 835 (noting organizers and press routinely refer
to March 17th celebration as "Evacuation-St. Patrick's Day Parade"). See generally
supra notes 37-40 and accompanying text (discussing historical context of parade).
"See ACLU Brief, supra note 33, at 16; Joe Sciacca, St. Patrick's Day Brouhaha
Marches On: Lawyer: City Has Ties to Parade, BOSTON HERALD, Feb. 9, 1993, at 1
(noting that, although no Boston city workers assisted in organizing Parade on city
time, Boston's Veterans Services official helped organize event on his own time).
' In order for the public function theory to apply to private actors, the activity
must be both a traditional government function and a power "traditionally exclu-
sively reserved to the State." Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 157, 159-60
(1978) (citations omitted) (holding that dispute resolution between debtors and
creditors is not public function because there is no history of similar government
activity); see also Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 627-28 (1991)
(holding that private litigant would violate equal protection guarantee if he used
peremptory challenges to exclude minorities from jury service because litigant's ac-
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are intended to prevent the party from assuming control over lo-
cal government functions without accepting the concomitant re-
sponsibilities.66
The courts which have analyzed whether parades commemo-
rating civic holidays were activities traditionally reserved to the
state authority have reached differing conclusions. The deter-
mination seems to hinge upon both the availability of alternate
celebrations in which the excluded group may participate and
the importance of the event to the community.68 For example, in
Gay Veterans Association, Inc. v. American Legion,9 a homosex-
ual veterans group sought injunctive relief mandating its par-
tions were intertwined with traditional government function of adjudicating civil
cases). Additionally, courts have created a causation requirement for public function
analysis; namely, the State must be involved in the specific activity or decision
making that results in the constitutional deprivation. See Blum v. Yaretsky, 457
U.S. 991, 1011 (1982) (asserting that mere funding or regulation of activity is not
persuasive in "demonstrating that the State is responsible for decisions made by the
entity") (emphasis added); Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 358-59 (1974)
(holding privately owned and operated utility's termination of customer's service
was not attributable to State merely because utility was heavily regulated and en-
joyed a partial monopoly); Powe v. Miles, 407 F.2d. 73, 81 (2d Cir. 1968) (requiring
state to be involved with "activity that caused the injury"). See generally Elkind, su-
pra note 44, at 690-98 (analyzing public function theory). But see Gilmore v. City of
Montgomery, 417 U.S. 556, 582 (1974) (White, J. concurring). Justice White as-
serted that the state need not make, advise, or authorize private decisions to dis-
criminate or by itself create a reasonable belief in mind of an ordinary citizen that
the state is condoning discriminatory behavior. Id.
6'Cf. Powe, 407 F.2d at 80 (describing public function theory as those
"particular activities or facilities so clearly governmental in nature that the state
cannot be permitted to escape responsibility by allowing them to be managed by a
supposedly private agency.").
Compare Gay Veterans Ass'n, Inc. v. American Legion-N.Y. County Org., 621
F. Supp. 1510, 1516 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (concluding that organizers of Veterans Day
Parade in New York City were not state actors) with North Shore Right to Life
Comm. v. Manhassett Am. Legion Post No. 304, 452 F. Supp. 834, 837-38 (E.D.N.Y.
1978) (determining that organizers of Memorial Day Parade in North Hempstead
were state actors by acting as fiduciary of government).
6 See Gay Veterans, 621 F. Supp. at 1516 (reasoning that organizers of Vet-
eran's Day Parade were not state actors because parade was "just one of many
ceremonies throughout New York City to commemorate Veterans Day"); North
Shore, 452 F. Supp. at 836 (noting that Memorial Day parades have been
"communities' major annual events," thus private organizer inherits fiduciary duty
of local government by administering celebration); see also Shane, supra note 57, at
1595 (asserting that parade conducted by ideologically distinct group would not be
recognized as state action "even if licensed, policed, and otherwise facilitated by
government decision makers who do not purport to endorse anything about the
group but its right to self-expression").
621 F. Supp. 1510 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
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ticipation in the New York City Veteran's Day Parade.70 The
court used the public function theory to evaluate whether the
New York County American Legion, the parade sponsor, could be
deemed a state actor.' The court found that sponsorship of a pa-
rade celebrating a public holiday was not traditionally an exclu-
sive governmental function." More importantly, the court noted
the existence of ample alternative channels of communication
commemorating the holiday throughout New York City. 3 The
court was therefore compelled to hold that the organizer was not
a state actor. 4 The exclusion by the American Legion did not
deprive the Gay Veterans Association of the federally protected
right to freedom of expression and equal access to a public forum
under the color of law.75
Although it is undisputed that the South Boston Parade is
the most prestigious celebration of Irish-American heritage in
Boston,76 the City of Boston has instituted a city-sponsored al-
ternative St. Patrick's Day parade in Cambridge. 7   The Cam-
bridge parade, which is scheduled to become an annual event,
clearly provides an adequate alternative forum for dissident
groups, such as GLIB, to assert their message of cultural pride.
Additionally, there are numerous parades throughout Massa-
70 Id. at 1511.
71 Id. at 1517-18.
Id. (noting that New York law rejects notion that city sponsored Veterans Day
parades become exclusive public functions).
73 Id. (finding numerous veterans' organizations sponsor parades throughout
New York City).
" Gay Veterans, 621 F. Supp. at 1516-18.
75 Id.
'6 See O'CONNOR, supra note 35, at 105-07 (discussing development and impor-
tance of Parade to "Southie" residents); Chris Reidy, The Greening of America; St.
Patrick's Day Has Become More U.S. Than Irish, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 14, 1993, at
A19 (reporting that South Boston Parade, after World War I, "emerged as the city's
preeminent exhibition of Irish Americana").
District Court Judge John Keenan, in denying the Irish Lesbian and Gay Or-
ganization's ("ILGO") request to conduct a separate parade up New York City's Fifth
Avenue before the Hibernian's 1995 St. Patrick's Day Parade, noted that "Irish his-
tory, tradition and culture are not so drab and sterile as to permit of only one hero -
St. Patrick." Irish Lesbian and Gay Org. v. Bratton, 882 F. Supp. 315, 320 (S.D.N.Y.
1995). Judge Keenan suggested several alternative celebrations of Irish heritage for
ILGO to conduct at other times such as in October around the birthdays of famous
Irishmen Michael Collins, Eamon de Valera, and Oscar Wilde. Id. at n.3.
77See Patricia Smith, You March, You're Irish, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 13, 1995 at
13 (noting some refer to Cambridge celebration "alternative" parade); Doreen Iudica
Vigue & Zachary R. Dowdy, Parade Cheered in Cambridge, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 13,
1995, at 14 (describing first St. Patrick's Day parade in Cambridge).
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chusetts in which GLIB could participate. 78  The South Boston
parade appears to be just one of many celebrations open to
GLIB. 79 The Council's status as a putative private party, there-
fore, should withstand classification as a state actor, since the
Parade does not meet the criteria of the public functions theory.
B. Mutual Contacts Theory
The mutual contacts theory is based upon the premise that a
nominally private party which assumes apparent governmental
authority is imputed with concomitant governmental responsi-
bilities."0 Ordinarily, this relationship is established by either:
(1) extensive governmental regulation; (2) close physical and
economic contacts; or (3) direct governmental aid or subsidies."'
In the case of the Parade, the Council was granted the authority
to organize and conduct the Parade in 1947 by Mayor James M.
78 In evaluating whether GLIB should be included in the 1995 South Boston pa-
rade the district court recognized that GLIB's exclusion from the South Boston pa-
rade would not deprive them of the opportunity to march in other parades through-
out Massachusetts. South Boston War Allied Veterans Council v. City of Boston, 875
F. Supp. 891, 916-17 (D. Mass. 1995).
79 See supra note 78 (discussing possibility of GLIB's participation in alternative
parades). The court further suggested that GLIB follow the New York example and
conduct its own parade immediately after the one organized by the Council. South
Boston War Allied Veterans Council, 875 F. Supp. at 916-17. But see North Shore,
452 F. Supp. at 840 (asserting that opportunity to have separate parade following
that of organizer's does not provide defense to claim of state action); see also Olivieri
v. Ward, 801 F.2d 602, 606-08 (2d Cir. 1986) (recognizing unique symbolic impor-
tance of St. Patrick's Cathedral during New York City's Gay Rights Parade and or-
dering opposing parties to share sidewalk in order to allow equal opportunity for
their competing voices), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 917 (1987).
80 Specifically, the mutual contacts theory is based upon the State's apparent
grant of authority to a private party arising out of a sufficient entanglement be-
tween the government and the private actor. 2 ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 45,
at § 16.4. This theory encompasses three general categories: (1) when the private
actor is subject to extensive governmental regulation; (2) when a wide range of
physical and economic contacts exist between the private actor and the government;
and (3) when the government has provided direct aid or subsidies to the private
party. Id.
The Supreme Court's best attempt to enunciate this nebulous category was in
Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991 (1982). "[A] State normally can be held responsible
for a private decision only when it has exercised coercive power or has provided
such significant encouragement, either overt or covert, that the choice must in law
be deemed to be that of the State." Id. at 1004; see also Tulsa Professional Collection
Serv., Inc. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478, 486 (1988) (requiring "overt, significant assistance
of state officials" to find state action). But see Elkind, supra note 44, at 699
(postulating that "significance" test need not be met to enjoin government aid).
8, See supra note 80 (explaining mutual contacts theory).
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Curley.82 Additionally, prior to the 1993 Parade, the Council ac-
cepted direct subsidies and organizational assistance from the
City of Boston.'
The mere granting of authority to conduct the Parade is in-
sufficient to warrant classification of the Council as a state actor
because the Parade is not a traditional government undertak-
ing." Satisfaction of the mutual contacts theory, therefore, is
dependent upon the treatment of Boston's subsidation of the Pa-
rade.
In order to prevent the public funding of discriminatory be-
havior, a nominally private party receiving public funds is sub-
jected to heightened scrutiny for the purpose of state action
analysis.' The City of Boston's subsidization of twenty-five per-
cent of the Parade's costs prior to 1993 probably would have con-
stituted a sufficient economic entanglement so as to render the
Council a state actor.' In 1993, however, the Council refused to
Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston, 115 S.
Ct. 2338, 2341 (1995). The court order compelled the City of Boston to award the
permit to the Council for the 1995 Parade. South Boston Allied War Veterans Coun-
cil, 875 F. Supp. at 920 (holding that City should issue permit to Council on "usual
terms and conditions"); see Patricia Nealon, St. Pat's Parade Can Go Without Gays,
Judge Says; Event is Billed as a Protest, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 18, 1995, Metro, at 1
(quoting office of Boston's Mayor Menino as stating that permit was issued because
"city is now obligated to comply with the [federal court] judge's ruling"). The City's
refusal to grant the 1995 permit, until forced by court order, indicates a degree of
separation between the City and the Council. See Otway v. City of New York, 818 F.
Supp. 659, 663 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (noting that New York City's refusal to grant permit
to Ancient Order of Hibernians until compelled by court order "made it clear that
[the City] endorsed] quite a different message").
' See supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text (discussing City's involvement
prior to 1993).
' See supra notes 68, 78 and accompanying text (discussing rejection of gov-
ernmental undertaking on basis of alternative parades).
8 See Powe v. Miles, 407 F.2d 73, 82 (2d Cir. 1968) (stating that public funds
provided to private parties is subject to heightened scrutiny because use of public
funds for discriminatory practices will be particularly offensive).
"' See Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455 (1973) (holding that grant of books to
students who attend racially discriminatory private schools, under state law provid-
ing books to all students attending both public and private schools, constituted state
action); Powe, 407 F.2d at 81 (asserting that financial involvement must be "so
dominant as to afford basis for a contention that the state is merely utilizing private
trustees to administer a state activity"); Griffin v. State Bd. of Educ., 296 F. Supp.
1178, 1181 (E.D. Va. 1969) (asserting that "any assistance whatever by the State to-
wards provision of a racially segregated education, exceeds the pale of tolerance
demarked by the Constitution"); Shane, supra note 57, at 1594-95 (speculating that
Mardi Gras parades would be regarded as state action "because their deeply public
character is conjoined with significant efforts by public authorities to facilitate the
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accept any financial or organizational assistance in an effort to
avoid state actor status.87 Nevertheless, the Council's refusal of
governmental aid is not dispositive of the issue, an examination
of effect of this refusal must be conducted. For example, in
Evans v. Newton," Senator Bacon of Georgia willed a park in
trust to the city of Macon for use as a whites-only park, with a
reversionary interest if the terms of the trust were breached
through efforts at integration.89 After operating the park on a
segregated basis, the city, pursuant to a court order, resigned the
trust and substituted private individuals as trustees." The
Court held that the city could not privatize the park in an effort
to avoid integrating it, reasoning that the park could not lose the
stigma of state action since its continued existence conveyed the
appearance of government approval of discriminatory practices.9
The City's inaction in the face of the Council's exclusion of
GLIB could be construed as tacit governmental approval, render-
ing the Council a state actor. Such an argument is clearly over-
shadowed, however, by the affirmative actions of government of-
parades"); Elkind, supra note 44, at 677 (noting that "courts should frankly recog-
nize that aid in any form practically supportive of the challenged activity constitutes
meaningful state involvement").
District Court Judge Kevin Duffy, in holding that the organizers of the New
York St. Patrick's Day Parade were not state actors, distinguished the New York
and Boston celebrations, speculating that "[Boston's] 'traditional values,' multi-
purpose parade requires 'detailed participation by city agencies in planning and
execution' which clearly illustrates the civic nature of the parade." Ancient Order of
Hibernians v. Dinkins, 814 F. Supp. 358, 369 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (quoting Irish-
American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston v. City of Boston, Superior
Court of Mass., Suffolk County, Civ. No. 92-1519 (Feb. 19, 1993), affd, 636 N.E.2d
1293 (1994), rev'd sub nom. Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual
Group of Boston, 115 S. Ct. 2338 (1995)). But see Capital Area Right to Life, Inc. v.
Downtown Frankfort, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 2153, 2155 (1994) (mem.) (O'Connor, J., dis-
senting) (asserting that state subsidy of private organization exercising functions
which might otherwise be performed by State in traditional public forum does not
constitute state action for First Amendment purposes); Grossner v. Trustees of Co-
lumbia Univ., 287 F. Supp. 535, 547-48 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) ("[R]eceipt of money from
the State is not, without a good deal more, enough to make the recipient an agency
or instrumentality of the Government.").
Don Aucoin, In Aftermath of Parade, Groups Plan for Future, BOSTON GLOBE,
Mar. 17, 1992, at 1 (reporting that John Hurley decided to privatize the parade so
organizers could decide who would be permitted to march); Luz Delgado, Group
Vows to Return Next Year With Others, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 16, 1992, at 14 (noting
organizers efforts to privatize parade).
88 382 U.S. 296 (1966).
89 Id. at 297.
Id. at 297-98.
9' Id. at 299-302.
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ficials to disassociate themselves from the Council's message.
City and state officials sought to negotiate a compromise and,
ultimately, to force the inclusion of GLIB in the Parade.92 In
light of the strong signals sent by these officials that they ex-
pected the Council to allow participation, and the publicly
threatened consequences for failing to comply with their man-
date, the Council's exclusion of GLIB from the 1993 Parade
should not be interpreted as governmental endorsement of the
Council's discriminatory policies.9" Therefore, under the mutual
contracts theory the Council would be deemed a private party
rather than a state actor.
C. Balancing Analysis
Commentators have suggested, over the Court's emphatic
denial, that a determination of state action represents a balanc-
ing of interests.94 The competing interests present in the Parade
92 See Don Aucoin, Southie Veterans to Vote Tonight on Gay Marchers, BOSTON
GLOBE, Mar. 9, 1992, at 1 (reporting that Mayor Flynn urged Council to relent and
allow GLIB to march); see also Yackle, supra note 35, at 841-48 (describing involve-
ment of political officials in Parade controversy and asserting that in 1993, city offi-
cials "sent a strong signal that they expected the Veterans to allow GLIB to march
and that there would be consequences if they refused").
13 See Otway v. City of New York, 818 F. Supp. 659, 663 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (finding
that reasonable observer would not interpret New York City's issuance of St. Pat-
rick's Day Parade permit to Ancient Order of Hibernians (AOH) as endorsement of
AOH's religious beliefs due to City's attempts to force inclusion of homosexual group
proselytizing contrary message).
' See Sue Davis, The Supreme Court: Finding State Action ... Sometimes, 26
HOW. L.J. 1395, 1400 (1985); Stern, supra note 42, at 1216 (suggesting that deter-
muination of state action relates to constitutional value of activity); Elkind, supra
note 44, at 661-62 (recognizing that Court is swayed by importance of activity when
determining state action). See generally T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law
in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J. 943 (1987) (tracing history of use of balancing
as method of constitutional interpretation and proposing alternative methods). But
see Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 373-74 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissent-
ing) ("The Court has not adopted the notion, accepted elsewhere, that different
standards should apply to state action analysis when different constitutional claims
are presented."); Cole, supra note 42, at 330-31 (asserting that state action inquiry
depends solely on status of actor and does not consider extent to which action im-
pairs constitutional values).
Commentators who criticize the balancing approach recognize the inherent dif-
ficulties in applying a balancing analysis to the determination of state action. See
Richard S. Kay, The State Action Doctrine, the Public-Private Distinction, and the
Independence of Constitutional Law, 10 CONST. COMMENT 329, 341 (1993) (asserting
that "substitution of a balancing process for the application of fixed rules has sub-
stantially undermined" capacity to identify constitutional limitations on individual
action); Madry, supra note 42, at 510-11 (asserting that using balancing test which
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controversy are GLIB's right to equal treatment under the law
and the Council's right to free speech and association.95 Prob-
lems of racism and discrimination lie at the heart of a nation
founded on the principle that "all men are created equal."" The
absolute prohibition on the abridgement of free speech contained
in the First Amendment, however, places free speech in a pre-
ferred position relative to other constitutional rights.9 7 The pref-
erential treatment afforded this protection seems to tip the scale
in favor of upholding the Council's right to exclude GLIB." Al-
though the failure to utilize the state action doctrine to compel
GLIB's inclusion would appear to condone homophobia,99 the
Constitution simply does not impose an affirmative duty on the
considered private status of 'state actors' would result in paradox of private party
becoming "state agent for the purpose of bringing the agent under the [Fourteenth]
Amendment, but once under would shed her state identity for the way in which the
Amendment were to be applied").
9' See South Boston Allied War Veterans Council v. City of Boston, 875 F. Supp.
891, 914-17 (D. Mass. 1995). The court explicitly identified the competing interests
in 1995 Parade as follows: the Council's right to associate for expressive purposes
and GLIB's interest in being afforded equal access to the Parade in order to march
as an identifiable group and advocate its desired viewpoints. Id.
9' See Charles L. Black, Jr., The Supreme Court: 1966 Term-Foreword: "State
Action," Equal Protection, and California's Proposition 14, 81 HARv. L. REV. 69, 107
(1967) ("Racism, including that formally 'private' racism that blots so much of public
life, is not only a national problem, but the national problem.").
9' See Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 266 (1952); Murdock v. Pennsylva-
nia, 319 U.S. 105, 115 (1943) ("Freedom of press, freedom of speech, freedom of re-
ligion are in a preferred position."); see also R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct.
2538, 2549-50 (1992) (indicating rhetorically that right of free expression not easily
outweighed by equality concerns). But see Michael Klarman, An Interpretive History
of Modern Equal Protection, 90 MICH. L. REV. 213, 276 (1991) (arguing that Court
"is willing to relax considerably the state action requirement as part of its battle
against race discrimination").
98 See Larry Alexander, The Public/Private Distinction and Constitutional Lim-
its on Private Power, 10 CoNsT. COMMENT 361, 374-75 (1993) (recognizing that as-
sociational and ideological interests on side of right to discriminate and state inter-
est in avoiding enforcement costs may "tip the balance" in favor of private party's
discriminatory practices); see also Shane, supra note 57, at 1587 (proposing that re-
lationship between personal autonomy and opportunity for public expression of
shared beliefs overcomes argument for direct constitutional control of expressive
parades); Stern, supra note 42, at 1199-2000 (postulating that, under Rehnquist
Court, "an effort to identify and restrain state action where the primary actor is
nongovernmental will generally not be considered a vital effectuation of constitu-
tional norms").
See Black, supra note 96, at 107 (stating that failure to recognize or unwar-
rantedly limit application of state action doctrine to prevent racism "confirm[s] ra-
cism pro tanto"); Dilan A. Esper, Note, Some Thoughts on the Puzzle of State Action,
68 S. CAL. L. REV. 663, 684 n.99 (1995) (asserting that it is imperative for Court to
avoid "legalization of racism" through its state action holdings).
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State to eliminate discriminatory actions by private parties. 00
CONCLUSION
The St. Patrick's Day Parade occupies a special place in the
hearts of all people of Irish descent. It represents the pride that
arises from suffering and overcoming discrimination on the basis
of one's heritage and religious beliefs. The Supreme Court had
the opportunity and the obligation in Hurley v. Irish-American
Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston to resolve the Parade
controversy and lift the cloud of legal issues surrounding the
feast of St. Patrick. The Court's failure to address the underly-
ing issue of state action will result in continued litigation which
casts an unwelcome shadow over the annual celebration. 1'
100 The lack of an affirmative duty to eliminate discrimination has led to criti-
cism of the state action doctrine. See Madry, supra note 42, at 557-68 (advocating
version of state action doctrine under which Fourteenth Amendment would require
states to create legal rights between citizens and State, protecting fundamental in-
terests of persons against invasion by State or private parties); see also supra note
4, at 246 ("[Wihere it is the state's persistent inaction in the face of patterns of dep-
rivation for which state and society seem too many to bear collective responsibility,
the premise that only identifiable state 'action' may be called to constitutional ac-
count is deeply troubling."); cf Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 50 (1992)
(suggesting that inaction in face of discrimination in jury selection harms entire
justice system).
On the other hand, the lack of an affirmative duty recognizes that conflicts be-
tween individual rights are inevitable in a form of government that exists to protect
the unfettered right of free expression of its citizenry. As District Court Judge We-
instein stated:
Sometimes respect for the sensibilities of our fellow Americans suggests
restraint in the unremitting and maximum enforcement of our constitu-
tional rights. In a nation such as ours, its very pluralism requires some
forbearance. The principles of freedom and equality must be tempered by
that of fraternity if we are not to be torn apart. We do not inflict unneces-
sary wounds on each other. We live in peace with neighbors we differ with,
sometimes by agreeing not to flaunt our disagreements on all occasions.
North Shore Right to Life Comm. v. Manhassett Am. Legion Post No. 304, 452 F.
Sup. 834,840-41 (E.D.N.Y. 1978).In light of the Supreme Court's silence, it comes as no surprise that the Irish
gay and lesbian groups continue their fight to force inclusion in St. Patrick's Day
parades, despite adverse lower court rulings. See Jane Furse, St. Pat's Protestors
Plan to Act Up Again, DAILY NEWS (New York), Feb. 18, 1996, News, at 59
(reporting ILGO's recent appeal from denial to march in 1996 New York parade); see
also Maureen O'Donnell, Irish Gay Group Fails to get in S. Side Parade, CHI. SUN
TwIEs, Mar. 12, 1996, at 12 (reporting "Irish Queers" unsuccessful attempt to march
in Chicago's South Side parade despite fact that group marches in "downtown pa-
rade"). The annual outcries in New York have reached the point where one reporter
included the gay and lesbian protesting among a short list of traditional element[s]
of ritual that have come to define the parade. Dan Barry, Emotions Were of Many
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Where adequate alternative conduits for the expression of an op-
posing message exist, organizers of expressive parades, such as
the South Boston Allied War Veterans Council who do not re-
ceive governmental subsidization should be characterized as pri-
vate actors under any theory of state action analysis. Therefore,
such organizers should be permitted to exclude groups which es-
pouse a message inconsistent with their own.
James C. Farrell2
Hues Under Parade's Banners of Green, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 1996, § 1, at 33.
102 The author wishes to thank his parents for their constant love, support, and
encouragement.
May the road rise to meet you;
May the wind be always at your back.
May the sun shine warm upon your face,
and may the rains fall soft upon your field.
Until we meet again, may God hold you in the palm of His hand.
Ancient Irish Blessing.
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